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ARMS CONTROL
BRIEFING BOOK
FOR
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VISIT TO EUROPEAN CAPITALS
21 - 31 October 1989

Office of the Secretary of Defense *5052*
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Background

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JOINT U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT STATEMENT

Ronald W. Reagan, President of the United States of America, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, met in Washington on December 7-10, 1987.

Attending the meeting on the U.S. side were Vice President George Bush; Secretary of State George P. Shultz; Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci; Chief of Staff Howard M. Baker, Jr.; Acting Assistant to the President Lieutenant General Colin L. Powell; Counselor of the Department of State Ambassador Max M. Kampelman; Ambassador-at-Large and Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters, Paul H. Nitze; Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Ambassador Edward L. Rowny; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.; Ambassador of the U.S. to the USSR Jack F. Matlock; and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Rozanne L. Ridgway.

Attending on the Soviet side were Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard A. Shevardnadze; Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Alexander N. Yakovlev; Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly F. Dobrynin; Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Vladimir M. Kamentsev; Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei F. Akhromeev; Assistant to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly S. Chernyaev; Head of the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee Valeriy I. Boldin; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Alexandr A. Gerasimertnykh; Ambassador of the USSR to the United States of America Yuri V. Dubinin; Member of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Victor P. Karpov; and Ambassador at Large Aleksey A. Obukhov.

During the course of the official visit, which had been agreed during the two leaders' November 1985 meeting in Geneva, the President and the General Secretary held comprehensive and detailed discussions on the full range of issues between the two countries, including arms reductions, human rights and humanitarian issues, settlement of regional conflicts, and bilateral relations. The talks were candid and constructive, reflecting both the continuing differences between the two sides, and their understanding that these differences are not insurmountable obstacles to progress in areas of mutual interest.

They reaffirmed their strong commitment to a vigorous dialogue encompassing the whole of the relationship.

The leaders reviewed progress to date in fulfilling the broad agenda they agreed at Geneva and advanced at Reykjavik. They took particular satisfaction in the conclusion over the last two years of important agreements in some areas of this agenda.

The President and the General Secretary affirmed the fundamental importance of their meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik, which laid the basis for concrete steps in a process intended to improve strategic stability and reduce the risk of conflict. They will continue to be guided by their solemn conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. They are determined to prevent any war between the United States and the Soviet Union, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority.

The two leaders recognized the special responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union to search for realistic ways to prevent confrontation and to promote a more sustainable

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and stable relationship between their countries. To this end, they agreed to intensify dialogue and to encourage emerging trends toward constructive cooperation in all areas of their relations. They are convinced that in so doing they will also contribute, with other nations, to the building of a safer world as humanity enters the third millennium.

I. ARMS CONTROL

The INF Treaty

The two leaders signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate Range and Shorter Range Missiles. This treaty is historic both for its objective -- the complete elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms -- and for the innovative character and scope of its verification provisions. This mutual accomplishment makes a vital contribution to greater stability.

Nuclear and Space Talks

The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive arms. They noted the considerable progress which has been made toward conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50-percent reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to work toward the completion of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty during the next meeting of leaders of state in the first half of 1988. Recognizing that areas of agreement and disagreement are recorded in detail in the Joint Draft Treaty Text, they agreed to instruct their negotiators to accelerate resolution of issues within the Joint Draft Treaty Text including early agreement on provisions for effective verification.

OSD 3.3(b)(2),(5)

In so doing, the negotiators should build upon the agreements on 50-percent reductions achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed and now reflected in the agreed portions of the Joint Draft START Treaty Text being developed in Geneva, including agreement on

ARMY 3.3(w)(2),(5)

No word in Russian

Such an agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner.

As priority tasks, they should focus on the following issues:

- (a) The additional steps necessary to ensure that the reductions enhance strategic stability. This will include a
- (b) The counting rules governing the number of long-range nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber. The Delegations shall define concrete rules in this area.

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OSD 3.3(b)(2),(s)

- (c) The counting rules with respect to existing ballistic missiles. The sides proceed from the assumption that existing types of ballistic missiles are deployed with the following numbers of warheads. In the United States:

ARMY 3.3(b)(2),(s)

Procedures will be developed that enable verification of the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles of each specific type. In the event either side changes the number of warheads declared for a type of deployed ballistic missile, the sides shall notify each other in advance. There shall also be agreement on how to account for warheads on future types of ballistic missiles covered by the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

- (d) The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs.

The sides committed themselves to establish ceilings on such missiles, and to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations, which could include the employment of National Technical Means, cooperative measures and on-site inspection.

- (e) Building upon the provisions of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the measures by which the provisions of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms can be verified will, at a minimum, include:

1. Data exchanges, to include declarations by each side of the number and location of weapon systems limited by the Treaty and of facilities at which such systems are located and appropriate notifications. These facilities will include locations and facilities for production and final assembly, storage, testing, and deployment of systems covered by this Treaty. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the Treaty is signed and updated periodically after entry into force.
2. Baseline inspection to verify the accuracy of these declarations promptly after entry into force of the Treaty.
3. On-site observation of the elimination of strategic systems necessary to achieve the agreed limits.
4. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production and support facilities to confirm the output of these facilities.
5. Short-notice on-site inspection of:
 - (1) declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits;

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- (ii) locations where systems covered by this Treaty remain after achieving the agreed limits; and
 - (iii) locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).
6. The right to implement, in accordance with agreed-upon procedures, short-notice inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring.
 7. Provisions prohibiting the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by national technical means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight.
 8. Measures designed to enhance observation of activities related to reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms by National Technical Means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party.

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Taking into account the preparation of the Treaty on strategic offensive arms, the leaders of the two countries also instructed their delegations in Geneva to work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time. Intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action. Such an agreement must have the same legal status as the Treaty on strategic offensive arms, the ABM Treaty, and other similar legally binding agreements. This agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner. Therefore, they direct their delegations to address these issues on a priority basis.

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The sides shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Other Arms Control Issues

The President and the General Secretary reviewed a broad range of other issues concerning arms limitation and reduction. The sides emphasized the importance of productive negotiations on security matters and advancing in the main areas of arms limitation and reduction through equitable, verifiable agreements that enhance security and stability.

Nuclear Testing

The two leaders welcomed the opening November 9, 1987, of full-scale, step-by-step negotiations, in accordance with the joint statement adopted in Washington on September 17, 1987, by the Secretary of State of the United States and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR:

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The U.S. and Soviet sides have agreed to begin before December 1, 1987, full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations which will be conducted in a single forum. In these negotiations the sides as the first step will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the U.S.-USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process. This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination. For the purpose of the elaboration of improved verification measures for the U.S.-USSR Treaties of 1974 and 1976 the sides intend to design and conduct joint verification experiments at each other's test sites. These verification measures will, to the extent appropriate, be used in further nuclear test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached.

The leaders also welcomed the prompt agreement by the sides to exchange experts visits to each other's nuclear testing sites in January 1988 and to design and subsequently to conduct a Joint Verification Experiment at each other's test site. The terms of reference for the Experiment are set forth in the statement issued on December 9, 1987, by the Foreign Ministers of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The leaders noted the value of these agreements for developing more effective measures to verify compliance with the provisions of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The President and the General Secretary reaffirmed the continued commitment of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in particular to strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The two leaders expressed satisfaction at the adherence since their last meeting of additional parties to the Treaty, and confirmed their intent to make, together with other states, additional efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Treaty.

The President and the General Secretary expressed support for international cooperation in nuclear safety and for efforts to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, under further strengthened IAEA safeguards and appropriate export controls for nuclear materials, equipment and technology. The leaders agreed that bilateral consultations on non-proliferation were constructive and useful, and should continue.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

The leaders welcomed the signing September 15, 1987, in Washington of the agreement to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in their capitals. The agreement will be implemented promptly.

Chemical Weapons

The leaders expressed their commitment to negotiation of a verifiable, comprehensive and effective international convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. They welcomed progress to date and reaffirmed the need for intensified negotiations toward conclusion of a truly global and verifiable convention encompassing all chemical weapons-capable states. The U.S. and Soviet Union are in favor of greater openness and intensified confidence-building with

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respect to chemical weapons both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis. They agreed to continue periodic discussions by experts on the growing problem of chemical weapons proliferation and use.

Conventional Forces

The President and General Secretary discussed the importance of the task of reducing the level of military confrontation in Europe in the area of armed forces and conventional armaments. The two leaders spoke in favor of early completion of the work in Vienna on the mandate for negotiations on this issue, so that substantive negotiations may be started at the earliest time with a view to elaborating concrete measures. They also noted that the implementation of the provisions of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is an important factor in strengthening mutual understanding and enhancing stability, and spoke in favor of continuing and consolidating this process. The President and the General Secretary agreed to instruct their appropriate representatives to intensify efforts to achieve solutions to outstanding issues.

They also discussed the Vienna (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction) negotiations.

Follow-Up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

They expressed their determination, together with the other 33 participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to bring the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Conference to a successful conclusion, based on balanced progress in all principal areas of the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document.

II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS

The leaders held a thorough and candid discussion of human rights and humanitarian questions and their place in the U.S.-Soviet dialogue.

III. REGIONAL ISSUES

The President and the General Secretary engaged in a wide-ranging, frank and businesslike discussion of regional questions, including Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq War, the Middle East, Cambodia, southern Africa, Central America and other issues. They acknowledged serious differences but agreed on the importance of their regular exchange of views. The two leaders noted the increasing importance of settling regional conflicts to reduce international tensions and to improve East-West relations. They agreed that the goal of the dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union on these issues should be to help the parties to regional conflicts find peaceful solutions that advance their independence, freedom and security. Both leaders emphasized the importance of enhancing the capacity of the United Nations and other international institutions to contribute to the resolution of regional conflicts.

IV. BILATERAL AFFAIRS

The President and the General Secretary reviewed in detail the state of U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations. They recognized the utility of further expanding and strengthening bilateral contacts, exchanges and cooperation.

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Bilateral Negotiations

Having reviewed the state of ongoing U.S. - Soviet negotiations on a number of specific bilateral issues, the two leaders called for intensified efforts by their representatives, aimed at reaching mutually advantageous agreements on: commercial maritime issues; fishing; marine search and rescue; radio navigational systems; the U.S.-USSR maritime boundary; and cooperation in the fields of transportation and other areas.

They noted with satisfaction agreement on the expansion, within the framework of the U.S.-Soviet Air Transport Agreement, of direct air passenger service, including joint operation of the New York - Moscow route by Pan American Airways and Aeroflot, and on the renewal of the U.S.-Soviet World Ocean Agreement.

People-to-People Contacts and Exchanges

The two leaders took note of progress in implementing the U.S.-Soviet General Exchanges Agreement in the areas of education, science, culture and sports, signed at their November 1985 Geneva meeting, and agreed to continue efforts to eliminate obstacles to further progress in these areas. They expressed satisfaction with plans to celebrate jointly the 30th anniversary of the first Exchanges Agreement in January 1988.

The two leaders reaffirmed the importance of contacts and exchanges in broadening understanding between their peoples. They noted with particular satisfaction the progress made in the development of people-to-people contacts under the initiative they launched at their 1985 meeting in Geneva -- a process which has involved tens of thousands of U.S. and Soviet citizens over the past two years. The leaders reaffirmed their strong commitment further to expand such contacts, including among the young.

Global Climate and Environmental Change Initiative

With reference to their November 1985 agreement in Geneva to cooperate in the preservation of the environment, the two leaders approved a bilateral initiative to pursue joint studies in global climate and environmental change through cooperation in areas of mutual concern, such as protection and conservation of stratospheric ozone, and through increased data exchanges pursuant to the U.S.-Soviet Environmental Protection Agreement and the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes. In this context, there will be a detailed study on the climate of the future. The two sides will continue to promote broad international and bilateral cooperation in the increasingly important area of global climate and environmental change.

Cooperative Activities

The President and General Secretary supported further cooperation among scientists of the U.S., the Soviet Union and other countries in utilizing controlled thermonuclear fusion for peaceful purposes. They affirmed the intention of the U.S. and USSR to cooperate with the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and Japan, under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in the quadripartite conceptual design of a fusion test reactor.

The two leaders noted with satisfaction progress under the bilateral Agreement on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy towards establishing a permanent working group in the field of nuclear reactor safety, and expressed their readiness to develop further cooperation in this area.

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The President and General Secretary agreed to develop bilateral cooperation in combatting international narcotics trafficking. They agreed that appropriate initial consultations would be held for these purposes in early 1988.

They also agreed to build on recent contacts to develop more effective cooperation in ensuring the security of air and maritime transportation.

The two leaders exchanged views on means of encouraging expanded contacts and cooperation on issues relating to the Arctic. They expressed support for the development of bilateral and regional cooperation among the Arctic countries on these matters, including coordination of scientific research and protection of the region's environment.

The two leaders welcomed the conclusion of negotiations to institutionalize the COSPAS/SARSAT space-based global search and rescue system, operated jointly by the U.S., the Soviet Union, France and Canada.

Trade

The two sides stated their strong support for the expansion of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations. They instructed their trade ministers to convene the U.S.-USSR Joint Commercial Commission in order to develop concrete proposals to achieve that objective, including within the framework of the Long-Term Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation. They agreed that commercially viable joint ventures complying with the laws and regulations of both countries could play a role in the further development of commercial relations.

Diplomatic Missions

Both sides agreed on the importance of adequate, secure facilities for their respective diplomatic and consular establishments, and emphasized the need to approach problems relating to the functioning of Embassies and Consulates General constructively and on the basis of reciprocity.

V. FURTHER MEETINGS

The President and General Secretary agreed that official contacts at all levels should be further expanded and intensified, with the goal of achieving practical and concrete results in all areas of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

General Secretary Gorbachev renewed the invitation he extended during the Geneva summit for President Reagan to visit the Soviet Union. The President accepted with pleasure. The visit will take place in the first half of 1988.

JOINT STATEMENT BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ISSUED FOLLOWING MEETINGS IN MOSCOW, USSR
MAY 29 - JUNE 1, 1988

In accordance with the understanding reached during the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in Geneva in November 1985, and confirmed at the Washington summit in December 1987, Ronald W. Reagan, President of the United States of America, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, met in Moscow May 29 - June 2, 1988.

Attending on the U.S. side were Secretary of State George P. Shultz; Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci; Presidential Chief of Staff Howard H. Baker, Jr.; Assistant to the President for National Security Colin L. Powell; Ambassador at Large and Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters, Paul H. Nitze; Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters, Ambassador Edward L. Rowny; Ambassador of the U.S. to the USSR Jack F. Matlock; and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Rozanne L. Ridgway.

Attending on the Soviet side were Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Andrei A. Gromyko; Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard A. Shevardnadze; Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Alexander N. Yakovlev; Alternate Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Defense of the USSR, Dimitri T. Yazov; Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly F. Dobrynin; Assistant of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Anatoly S. Chernyaev; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Alexander A. Bessmertnykh; and Ambassador of the USSR to the United States of America Yuri V. Dubinin.

The President and the General Secretary view the Moscow summit as an important step in the process of putting U.S.-Soviet relations on a more productive and sustainable basis. Their comprehensive and detailed discussions covered the full agenda of issues to which the two leaders agreed during their initial meeting in Geneva in November, 1985 -- an agenda encompassing arms control, human rights and humanitarian matters, settlement of regional conflicts, and bilateral relations. Serious differences remain on important issues; the frank dialogue which has developed between the two countries remains critical to surmounting these differences.

The talks took place in a constructive atmosphere which provided ample opportunity for candid exchange. As a result, the sides achieved a better understanding of each other's positions. The two leaders welcomed the progress achieved in various areas of U.S.-Soviet relations since their last meeting in Washington, notwithstanding the difficulty and complexity of the issues. They noted with satisfaction numerous concrete agreements which have been achieved, and expressed their determination to redouble efforts in the months ahead in areas where work remains to be done. They praised the creative and intensive efforts made by representatives of both sides in recent months to resolve outstanding differences.

Assessing the state of U.S.-Soviet relations, the President and the General Secretary underscored the historic importance of their meetings in Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow in laying the foundation for a realistic approach to the problems of strengthening stability and reducing the risk of conflict. They reaffirmed their solemn conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, their determination to prevent any war between the United States and Soviet Union, whether nuclear or conventional, and their disavowal of any intention to achieve military superiority.

The two leaders are convinced that the expanding political dialogue they have established represents an increasingly effective means of resolving issues of mutual interest and concern. They do not minimize the real differences of history, tradition and ideology which will continue to characterize the US-Soviet relationship. But they believe that the dialogue will endure, because it is based on realism and focused on the achievement of concrete results. It can serve as a constructive basis for addressing not only the problems of the present, but of tomorrow and the next century. It is a process which the President and the General Secretary believe serves the best interests of the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union, and can contribute to a more stable, more peaceful and safer world.

I.
Arms Control

The President and the General Secretary, having expressed the commitment of their two countries to build on progress to date in arms control, determined objectives and next steps on a wide range of issues in this area. These will guide the efforts of the two governments in the months ahead as they work with each other and with other states toward equitable, verifiable agreements that strengthen international stability and security.

INF

The President and the General Secretary signed the protocol on the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. The two leaders welcomed the entry into force of this historic agreement, which for the first time will eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms, and which sets new standards for arms control. The leaders are determined to achieve the full implementation of all the provisions and understandings of the Treaty, viewing joint and successful work in this respect as an important precedent for future arms control efforts.

Nuclear and Space Talks

The two leaders noted that a Joint Draft Text of a Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms has been elaborated. Through this process, the sides have been able to record in the Joint Draft Text extensive and significant areas of agreement and also to detail positions on remaining areas of disagreement. While important additional work is required before this Treaty is ready for signature, many key provisions are recorded in the Joint Draft Text and are considered to be agreed, subject to the completion and ratification of the Treaty.

Taking into account a Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, the sides have continued negotiations to achieve a separate agreement concerning the ABM Treaty building on the language of the Washington Summit Joint Statement dated December 10, 1987. Progress was noted in preparing the Joint Draft Text of an associated Protocol. In connection with their obligations under the Protocol, the sides have agreed in particular to use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers for transmission of relevant information. The leaders directed their negotiators to prepare the Joint Draft Text of a separate agreement and to continue work on its associated Protocol.

The Joint Draft Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms reflects the earlier understanding on establishing [REDACTED]

The draft Treaty also records the sides' agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level approximately 50 percent below the existing level and this level will not be exceeded.

During the negotiations the two sides have also achieved understanding that in future work on the Treaty they will act on the understanding that on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of existing types the counting rule will include the number of warheads referred to in the Joint Statement of December 10, 1987, and the number of warheads which will be attributed to each new type of ballistic missile will be subject to negotiation.

In addition, the sides agreed on a counting rule for heavy bomber armaments according to which heavy bombers equipped only for nuclear gravity bombs and SRAMs will count as one delivery vehicle against [REDACTED] and one warhead [REDACTED]

ARMY 3.3(b)(2), (g)

The delegations have also prepared Joint Draft Texts of an Inspection Protocol, a Conversion or Elimination Protocol, and a Memorandum of Understanding on data, which are integral parts of the Treaty. These documents build on the verification provisions of the INF Treaty, extending and elaborating them as necessary to meet the more demanding requirements of START. The START verification measures will, at a minimum, include:

- A. Data exchanges, to include declarations and appropriate notifications on the number and location of weapons systems limited by START, including locations and facilities for production, final assembly, storage, testing, repair, training, deployment, conversion, and elimination of such systems. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the Treaty is signed and updated periodically.
- B. Baseline inspections to verify the accuracy of these declarations.
- C. On-site observation of elimination of strategic systems necessary to meet the agreed limits.
- D. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production facilities to confirm the output of weapons to be limited.

E. Short-notice on-site inspection of:

- (i) declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits;
- (ii) locations where systems covered by this Treaty remain after achieving the agreed limits; and
- (iii) locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).

F. Short-notice inspection, in accordance with agreed upon procedures, of locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring.

G. Prohibition of the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by National Technical Means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight.

H. Procedures that enable verification of the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles of each specific type, including on-site inspection.

I. Enhanced observation of activities related to reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms by National Technical Means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party.

The two sides have also begun to exchange data on their strategic forces.

During the course of this meeting in Moscow, the exchanges on START resulted in the achievement of substantial additional common ground, particularly in the areas of ALCMs and the attempts to develop and agree, if possible, on a solution to the problem of verification of mobile ICBMs. The details of this additional common ground have been recorded in documents exchanged between the sides. The Delegations in Geneva will record these gains in the Joint Draft Text of the START Treaty.

The sides also discussed the question of limiting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs.

Ronald Reagan and M.S. Gorbachev expressed their joint confidence that the extensive work done provides the basis for concluding the Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms which will promote strategic stability and strengthen security not only of the peoples of the USSR and the USA, but of all mankind.

Guided by this fundamental agreement, the U.S. President and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU agreed to continue their efforts in this area energetically and purposefully. The Delegations of the two countries have been instructed to return to Geneva on July 12, 1988. It has been agreed as a matter of principle that, once the remaining problems are solved and the Treaty and its associated documents are agreed, they will be signed without delay.

Ballistic Missile Launch Notifications

The agreement between the U.S. and the USSR on notifications of launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, signed during the Moscow summit, is a practical new step, reflecting the desire of the sides to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation or accident.

Nuclear Testing

The leaders reaffirmed the commitment of the two sides to conduct in a single forum full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations on the issues relating to nuclear testing. In these negotiations the sides as the first step will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the U.S.-USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process. This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination. In implementing the first objective of these negotiations, agreement upon effective verification measures for the U.S.-USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, the sides agreed to design and conduct a Joint Verification Experiment at each other's test sites.

The leaders therefore noted with satisfaction the signing of the Joint Verification Experiment Agreement, the considerable preparation underway for the Experiment, and the positive cooperation being exhibited in particular by the substantial numbers of personnel now engaged in work at each other's test sites. They also noted the substantial progress on a new Protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and urged continuing constructive negotiations on effective verification measures for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

Expressing their conviction that the progress achieved so far forms a solid basis for continuing progress on issues relating to nuclear testing, the leaders instructed their negotiators to complete expeditiously the preparation of a Protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and to complete the preparation of a Protocol to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty as soon as possible after the Joint Verification Experiment has been conducted and analyzed. They confirmed their understanding that verification measures for the TTBT will, to the extent appropriate, be used in further nuclear test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached. They also declared their mutual intention to seek ratification of both the 1974 and 1976 Treaties when the corresponding protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty are completed, and to continue negotiations as agreed in the Washington joint summit statement.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The two leaders noted that this year marks the 20th Anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, one of the most important international arms control agreements with over 130 adherents. They reaffirmed their conviction that universal adherence to the NPT is important to international peace and security. They expressed the hope that each state not a party to the Treaty will join it, or make an equally binding commitment under international law to forego acquisition of nuclear weapons and prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. This will enhance the possibility of progress toward reducing nuclear armaments and reduce the threat of nuclear war.

The two leaders also confirmed their support of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and agreed that they would continue efforts to further strengthen it. They reaffirmed the value of their regular consultations on non-proliferation and agreed that they should continue.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

The leaders expressed satisfaction over the activation of the new communications link between the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in Moscow and Washington, established in accordance with the U.S.-Soviet agreement of September 15, 1987. It was agreed that the Centers can play an important role in the context of a future Treaty on reducing U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arms.

Chemical Weapons

The leaders reviewed the status of on-going multilateral negotiations and bilateral U.S.-Soviet consultations toward a comprehensive, effectively verifiable, and truly global ban on chemical weapons, encompassing all chemical weapons-capable states. They also expressed concern over the growing problem of chemical weapons proliferation and use.

The leaders reaffirmed the importance of efforts to address, as a matter of continuing urgency, the unique challenges of a chemical weapons ban and to achieve an effective convention. While noting the progress already achieved in the talks and the difficult problems with regard to effective monitoring of the global prohibition of chemical weapons and the non-use of dual-capable chemicals for chemical weapons purposes, the leaders underlined the need for concrete solutions to the problems of ensuring effective verification and undiminished security for all convention participants. They gave instructions to their respective delegations to this effect.

Both sides agreed on the vital importance of greater openness by all states as a way to build confidence and strengthen the foundation for an effective convention. The leaders also emphasized the necessity of close coordination on a multilateral basis in order to ensure the participation of all CW-possessing and CW-capable states in the convention.

Both sides strongly condemned the dangerous spread and illegal use of chemical weapons in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. They stressed the importance of both technical and political solutions to this problem and confirmed their support for international investigations of suspected violations. Noting the initial efforts being made to control the export of chemicals used in manufacturing chemical weapons, the leaders called on all nations with the capability of producing such chemicals to institute stringent export controls to inhibit the proliferation of chemical weapons.

Conventional Arms Control

The leaders emphasized the importance of strengthening stability and security in the whole of Europe. They welcomed progress to date on development of a mandate for new negotiations on armed forces and conventional armaments. They expressed their hope for an early and balanced conclusion to the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting. The President and the General Secretary also noted that full implementation of the provisions of the document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe can significantly increase openness and mutual confidence.

They also discussed the situation in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations in Vienna.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

They expressed their commitment to further development of the CSCE process. The U.S. and USSR will continue to work with the other 33 participants to bring the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting to a successful conclusion, through significant results in all the principal areas of the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document.

Ballistic Missile Technology Proliferation

The leaders agreed to bilateral discussions at the level of experts on the problem of proliferation of ballistic missile technology.

Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly

The President and the General Secretary noted the importance of the ongoing Third Special Session on Disarmament.

II.

Human Rights and Humanitarian Concerns

The President and the General Secretary engaged in a detailed discussion of human rights and humanitarian concerns. The leaders reviewed the increasingly broad and detailed U.S.-Soviet dialogue in this area and agreed that it should be conducted at all levels in order to achieve sustained, concrete progress. They noted that this dialogue should seek to maximize assurance of the rights, freedoms and human dignity of individuals; promotion of people-to-people communications and contacts; active sharing of spiritual, cultural, historical and other values; and greater mutual understanding and respect between the two countries. Toward this end, they discussed the possible establishment of a forum which, meeting regularly, would bring together participants from across the range of their two societies. They noted steps already taken to establish the exchange of information and contacts between legislative bodies of both countries, as well as discussions between legal experts, physicians and representatives of other professions directly involved in matters pertaining to human rights, and between representatives of non-governmental organizations.

III.

Regional Issues

The President and the General Secretary thoroughly discussed a wide range of regional questions, including the Middle East, the Iran-Iraq war, southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, Central America, Cambodia, the Korean Peninsula, and other issues. They expressed satisfaction with the April, 1988, conclusion in Geneva of accords on an Afghanistan settlement. Although the discussions revealed serious differences both in the assessment of the causes of regional tensions and in the means to overcome them, the leaders agreed that these differences need not be an obstacle to constructive interaction between the U.S. and USSR.

They reaffirmed their intention to continue U.S.-Soviet discussions at all levels aimed at helping parties to regional conflicts find peaceful solutions which advance their independence, freedom and security. They emphasized the importance of enhancing the capacity of the United Nations and other international institutions to contribute to the resolution of regional conflicts.

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17.
Bilateral Affairs

The President and the General Secretary reviewed progress in further expanding bilateral contacts, exchanges and cooperation since their meeting in Washington, D.C. in December 1987. They noted the increasingly important role that mutually beneficial interchange between the two countries can play in improving mutual understanding and providing stability in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. They stated their intention to intensify such ties.

They noted with particular satisfaction that concrete agreements had been reached in most of the areas identified at their meetings in Geneva, Reykjavik and Washington.

Bilateral Agreements and Cooperative Activities

The President and the General Secretary welcomed the conclusion of a number of bilateral agreements which open new opportunities for fruitful cooperation in the following fields: cooperation in transportation science and technology; maritime search and rescue; operational coordination between U.S. and Soviet radionavigation systems in the Northern Pacific and Bering Sea; and mutual fisheries relations.

The two leaders welcomed the recent signing of a new Memorandum on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety under the bilateral agreement on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.⁸ There was an exchange of notes to extend that Agreement.

They expressed satisfaction with the recent signing of a new protocol under the bilateral Housing Agreement for cooperation in construction research relating to extreme geological and unusual climatic conditions.

They reviewed the status of negotiations between the two countries concerning maritime shipping, the U.S.-USSR maritime boundary, basic scientific research, and emergency pollution clean-up in the Bering and Chukchi Seas. They instructed their negotiators to accelerate efforts to achieve mutually acceptable agreements in these areas at the earliest opportunity.

The two leaders welcomed the start of bilateral discussions on combatting narcotics trafficking. They noted with satisfaction ongoing consultations between the two sides concerning law of the sea, air and sea transportation safety, and areas of mutual interest in the field of law.

Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges

Noting the expansion of exchanges in the areas of education, science, culture and sports under the General Exchanges Agreement, the two leaders welcomed the signing of a new implementing program for 1989-91 under the Agreement and expressed their intention to continue expansion of such exchanges. During the time in which this program is in force, the two sides, taking into consideration their mutual interest as well as financial and technical conditions, will conduct negotiations on the opening of culture/information centers in the U.S. and the USSR with the aim of signing an appropriate agreement on behalf of the governments of both countries.

They expressed satisfaction that, over the course of their dialogue, people-to-people contacts and exchanges between non-governmental organizations have significantly increased and become one of the most dynamic elements in the bilateral relationship. They reaffirmed their commitment to further growth of such exchanges, which contribute to mutual understanding, and welcomed plans for increased exchanges of young people in the future. In this context, they expressed their readiness to consider in practical terms the idea of further developing exchanges of high school students. They cited recent joint U.S.-Soviet initiatives on culture, theater and the cinema as examples of new opportunities to engage those involved in the creative arts.

Noting the rapidly growing sports ties between the two countries, including their national Olympic committees, the two leaders expressed their support for the International Olympic movement, which promotes international cooperation and understanding through athletic competition.

Other Cooperative Activities

The President and the General Secretary noted the successful expansion of scientific cooperation within the framework of bilateral agreements in Environmental Protection, Medical Science and Public Health, Artificial Heart Research and Development, Agriculture, and Studies of the World Ocean, and expressed their intention to continue to expand activities under these Agreements in areas of mutual benefit to the two sides.

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The President and the General Secretary noted with pleasure the commencement of work on a conceptual design of an International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, between scientists and experts from the United States, Soviet Union, European Atomic Energy Community, and Japan. The two leaders noted the significance of this next step toward the development of fusion power as a cheap, environmentally sound, and essentially inexhaustible energy source for the benefit of all mankind.

The President and the General Secretary welcomed agreement by representatives of the United States, Soviet Union, Canada and France, to institutionalize in the near future the COSPAS/SARSAT space-based, life-saving global search and rescue system.

Both leaders reaffirmed their support for the WHO/UNICEF goal of reducing the scale of preventable childhood death through the most effective methods of saving children. They urged other countries and the international community to intensify efforts to achieve this goal.

Global Climate and Environmental Change Initiative

The two leaders expressed their satisfaction with activities since the Washington summit in expanding cooperation with respect to global climate and environmental change, including in areas of mutual concern relating to environmental protection, such as protection and conservation of stratospheric ozone and a possible global warming trend. They emphasized their desire to make more active use of the unique opportunities afforded by the space programs of the two countries to conduct global monitoring of the environment and the ecology of the Earth's land, oceans and atmosphere. They underscored the need to continue to promote both bilateral and multilateral cooperation in this important area in the future.

Initiative for Expanded Civil Space Cooperation

Recognizing the long-standing commitment of both countries to space science and exploration, and noting the progress made under the 1987 U.S.-USSR Cooperative Agreement in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, the two leaders agreed to a new initiative to expand civil space cooperation by exchanging flight opportunities for scientific instruments to fly on each other's spacecraft, and by exchanging results of independent national studies of future unmanned solar system exploration missions as a means of assessing prospects for further U.S.-Soviet cooperation on such missions. They also agreed to expand exchanges of space science data and of scientists, to enhance the scientific benefit that can be derived from the two countries' space research missions. They noted scientific missions to the Moon and Mars as areas of possible bilateral and international cooperation.

Arctic Contacts and Cooperation

Taking into account the unique environmental, demographic and other characteristics of the Arctic, the two leaders reaffirmed their support for expanded bilateral and regional contacts and cooperation in this area. They noted plans and opportunities for increased scientific and environmental cooperation under a number of bilateral agreements as well as within an International Arctic Science Committee of states with interests in the region. They expressed their support for increased people-to-people contacts between the native peoples of Alaska and the Soviet North.

The President and the General Secretary noted the positive role played by the multilateral Antarctic Treaty and emphasized the importance of U.S.-Soviet scientific and environmental cooperation in that region.

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Trade and Economic Affairs

The two sides reconfirmed their strong support for the expansion of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations and noted recent activity in this area. They reiterated their belief that commercially viable joint ventures complying with the laws and regulations of both countries could play a role in the further development of commercial relations. They welcomed the results of the meeting of the Joint U.S.-USSR Commercial Commission in April and noted with satisfaction that working groups had been created under the Commission to further the establishment of better conditions under which mutually advantageous trade can develop. Taking note of the 1974 Joint Statement and Protocol amending the Long-Term Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Facilitate Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation issued at the conclusion of the Joint Commercial Commission, they agreed that the Commission should continue to meet to build upon the forward momentum which has been generated.

The two leaders cited expanding relations between Aeroflot and Pan American Airlines under the government-to-government Civil Air Transportation Agreement as a positive example of mutually beneficial cooperation.

Consulates Exchange/Diplomatic and Consular Missions

The President and the General Secretary reaffirmed their agreement to open Consulates General in Kiev and New York as soon as practicable.

The two leaders discussed questions relating to ensuring adequate and secure conditions for U.S. and Soviet diplomatic and consular establishments and their personnel in each other's territory. They agreed on the need to approach problems relating to such matters constructively and on the basis of reciprocity.

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Date: 10 DEC 2017 Authority: EO 13526
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September 23, 1989

JOINT STATEMENT

Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze met September 22-23 in Jackson Hole, Wyoming for discussions on the entire spectrum of U.S.-Soviet relations, in the course of the Foreign Minister's official visit to the United States.

The Foreign Minister also had a discussion with President Bush on September 21 at the White House, where he delivered a letter from Chairman Gorbachev which contained new ideas and proposals on security questions. They had a wide-ranging exchange of views on the overall direction and prospects for development of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

The two sides attach great significance to contacts between U.S. and Soviet leaders in the development of the U.S.-Soviet dialogue at this important and promising point in U.S.-Soviet relations. Based on earlier understandings between President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev, the sides agreed that the next U.S.-Soviet summit meeting will take place in the United States in late spring-early summer 1990.

Both sides agree that their common goal is to build a more stable, constructive and sustainable relationship, one in which openness and cooperation increasingly replace mistrust and competition. While significant differences remain on certain issues, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister believe that -- with continuing efforts and shared commitment to a candid dialogue aimed at finding practical and concrete solutions -- it will be possible to further and broaden the progress that has been made in recent years in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Toward this end, the discussions in Jackson Hole were productive and serious. They were complemented by the efforts of experts working groups on all parts of the five-part agenda, both in Wyoming and preceding the ministerial in Washington. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister reached specific agreements in several areas, and defined new directions for work in other areas.

I

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister held a thorough and productive review on the range of arms control and disarmament issues. They noted with satisfaction that, since their May meeting in Moscow, the Nuclear and Space Talks, Nuclear Testing Talks, and bilateral consultations on chemical weapons have resumed.

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The Secretary and the Foreign Minister had a detailed discussion of nuclear and space issues, including the ideas contained in the letters exchanged by President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev.

Regarding ABM and space, the Soviet side introduced a new approach aimed at resolving this significant issue. Both sides agree that the Soviet approach opens the way to achieving and implementing a START Treaty without reaching a Defense and Space agreement. The sides agreed to drop the approach of a nonwithdrawal commitment while continuing to discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability to reduce the risk of nuclear war. The U.S. side said it would consider carefully the other aspects of the overall Soviet approach. Both sides agreed that their negotiators would consider these issues in Geneva. They also agreed that the negotiators would discuss the U.S. invitation for Soviet Government experts to visit two U.S. facilities involved in strategic defense research.

The Soviet side stated that, guided by its long-standing goal of strengthening the ABM Treaty regime, it had decided to completely dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar station. The U.S. side expressed satisfaction with this announcement.

At the same time, the Soviet side stressed again the necessity of removing its concerns about the U.S. radar stations in Greenland and Great Britain. The U.S. side promised to consider these concerns, in consultation with its Allies.

In the interest of promoting progress in the negotiations, the Secretary announced that the U.S. side was withdrawing its proposal to ban mobile ICBMs in START, contingent on the funding by the U.S. Congress of U.S. mobile ICBMs. The Soviet side expressed satisfaction with this announcement and the two sides agreed on the need further to develop provisions for effective verification for limits on mobile ICBMs. In this connection, they also reached agreement on additional elements of common ground regarding the verification of mobile ICBMs, building on the elements agreed at the Moscow summit and subsequent work in Geneva.

Both sides noted the need to resolve the ALCM and SLCM issues. On ALCMs, the Soviet side put forward a new idea concerning its approach on how to deal with ALCMs and heavy bombers.

On SLCMs, the Soviet side offered new approaches for dealing with this difficult problem. The Soviet side raised the possibility of dealing with SLCMs in a broader naval arms context. As for the Nuclear and Space Talks, the Soviet side appealed to the American side to concentrate on verification and

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said that in the context of a verification system for SLCMs, these weapons could be limited outside of the text of a START treaty on the basis of reciprocal obligations. While reiterating its willingness to study the Soviet ideas, the U.S. side for its part emphasized its doubts about the feasibility of a workable verification system for SLCMs, and noted its long-standing view that there are serious problems involved in any discussion of the limitation of naval arms.

The Soviet side responded positively to President Bush's June initiative on verification and stability measures. In this regard, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister had a thorough exchange on the details of the initiative, and signed an agreement encouraging the development of such measures and outlining principles for implementing them. They also completed an agreement on the advance notification of major strategic exercises. The sides examined the other verification and stability measures and agreed to explore these further in Geneva. OSD 3.3(b)(2)(f)

The sides also agreed that, for purposes of [REDACTED] ballistic missiles will be defined in terms of missiles and their associated launchers, thus resolving a long-standing issue. ARMY 3.3(6)(2)(f)

New instructions will be issued to negotiators to take account of the exchanges on these and other START issues.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister reaffirmed the objective of early conclusion of a comprehensive, verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons. To intensify efforts toward this goal, and to enhance openness and confidence between the two countries, they signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange. The MOU provides for an exchange of data on U.S. and Soviet chemical weapons stockpiles, and for visits and inspections of chemical weapons sites.

The sides adopted a special joint statement on chemical weapons in which they stressed the need to conclude a chemical weapons ban and underscored their concern about the problem posed by the proliferation of chemical weapons.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister examined the status of the nuclear testing negotiations. They noted that the verification protocol for the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty has been agreed ad referendum by their negotiators, and reached agreement to incorporate hydrodynamic and seismic monitoring, as well as on-site inspection, into the verification protocol for the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, as well as the levels above which these measurements would occur. In order to obtain a statistically significant number of data points to improve the national technical means of each side, each side will guarantee the other side the right to make on-site

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hydrodynamic yield measurements of at least two tests per year during the first five years following ratification of this treaty. After five years, each side shall guarantee one such hydrodynamic measurement a year thereafter unless otherwise agreed by the two sides. These agreements provide a framework for conclusion of the verification protocols, completing a process that began fifteen years ago. They instructed their delegations to continue intensive work to resolve all remaining issues so that these two documents can be submitted for ratification as quickly as possible.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister noted with approval the work being done in the negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe, and called for rapid conclusion of an agreement.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed in principle to the "Open Skies" concept proposed by President Bush in May, which could make a genuine contribution to openness and confidence-building. They noted their willingness to attend an international conference on the subject.

The sides noted the importance of joint efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union to prevent the proliferation of missiles and missile technology and agreed to activate bilateral consultations on this pressing problem.

II

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister had a thorough and frank exchange on regional issues. The sides reaffirmed their belief that active U.S. and Soviet support for political solutions that are comprehensive and based on broad national reconciliation could facilitate the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts around the world. They noted that the two sides continue to differ on some specific aspects of the question of arms supplies and their effect on the possibility of political settlements.

They noted that a cycle of regional experts discussions had been held on Central America, Afghanistan, Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Both sides found these discussions useful for understanding one another's views, and agreed to continue experts meetings in the future.

The sides expressed their support for efforts by the Central American countries to establish a lasting peace in that region on the basis of the Esquipulas Treaty and subsequent agreements, which include a commitment not to permit the use of their territory to support those seeking to destabilize other Central American countries. While noting their differences on certain questions, including the level of arms flows to the region, they called on all interested parties to support this process actively by respecting in full the letter and spirit of the

accords signed by the leaders of the five Central American countries. They also called upon all states outside the region to respect the request by the Central American countries to end all military assistance to irregular or insurgent forces.

The two sides agreed on the need for a political settlement in Afghanistan on the basis of national reconciliation, one that ensures the peaceful, independent and non-aligned status of Afghanistan. While their approaches differ over how to translate these principles into reality, they nevertheless agreed that a transition period is required as well as an appropriate mechanism to establish a broad-based government. The sides reaffirmed their commitment to the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan.

The sides reaffirmed their support for an active Middle East peace process. Among other issues, they also exchanged views on the place in that process of an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue leading to a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in which all relevant parties will participate.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister expressed in a separate joint statement their strong support for the Arab League Tripartite Committee plan on Lebanon to bring about a ceasefire, a lifting of the blockade and a dialogue among the Lebanese parties aimed at achieving a political settlement. They condemned the taking of hostages and called for the immediate release of all hostages.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister advocated a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia and a continuation of the negotiation process toward this end. At this stage, they feel it is most important to take efforts to avert intensification of the civil war and the return of the Pol Pot regime to power. The sides declared their readiness to announce, together with other states, a moratorium on military assistance to all Cambodian factions as part of a comprehensive settlement.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed on the need to implement fully and on schedule the UN plan for the granting of independence to Namibia, including the holding of free and fair elections. They expressed their support for the national reconciliation process in Angola and for efforts to secure peace and stability in Mozambique. The sides also advocated a peaceful, political solution to the internal conflicts in Ethiopia and supported the negotiation process underway between the Ethiopian Government and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front.

III

Within the framework of the on-going U.S.-Soviet dialogue on human rights and humanitarian affairs, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister held a constructive discussion of a broad range of human rights and humanitarian issues, including the role of international accords and generally accepted standards in the field of human rights and of the Helsinki Final Act and other CSCE agreements. Specific reference was made to policies and cases of exit and entry, freedom of conscience, criminal practices concerning which questions had been raised and on which information will be exchanged. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed to work to move forward on a range of programs that will promote a better understanding of each other's institutions, legislation and practices which affect human rights and humanitarian issues.

IV

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister discussed a range of questions related to the other two parts of the agenda, bilateral and transnational issues. They signed two agreements: the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Mutual Visits between Inhabitants of the Bering Straits Region and the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the Bering Straits Regional Commission.

A U.S.-USSR joint statement was also signed on a uniform interpretation of rules of international law governing innocent passage through territorial waters, which removes a potential source of friction in the relationship between the two countries. They endorsed a working paper containing proposals for extending the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. In furtherance of this, the sides have agreed to approach the three other Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council with a proposal to discuss this question.

U.S. and Soviet experts together elaborated an approach for resolution of the Northern Pacific Maritime Boundary issue. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister directed the experts to meet again soon to complete their work on this basis.

The two sides agreed to start talks regarding the possible expansion of air routes between the two countries.

In connection with the virtually completed agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy it was decided to accelerate completion of proposals aimed at drawing up a new agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Nuclear Energy.

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The sides reached agreement in principle that U.S. and Soviet Cultural and Information Centers would be opened in Moscow and Washington, respectively.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister approved a bilateral work program.

The sides also discussed matters connected with implementation of the U.S.-Soviet Memorandum of Understanding signed in January 1989 regarding cooperation in combatting the flow of illegal narcotics. They expressed readiness to consider new ideas for bilateral and international cooperation in this field. They agreed that experts from both sides would meet in Moscow before the end of 1989 to discuss concrete proposals.

The two sides conducted an extensive discussion on the problem of combatting international terrorism and agreed in principle that experts would meet again in early 1990.

The two sides underscored the desirability of intensifying contacts between high-level elected and appointed officials in a variety of areas.

They devoted special attention to continued and new cooperation on a range of bilateral and international environmental problems, including global and climate change, as well as the problem of various sources of pollution.

The two sides confirmed their intent to conclude an agreement on cooperation on study of the world oceans by the end of this year, and to continue their work of preparing an agreement on cooperation in the field of housing and other types of construction.

The two sides agreed to consult and cooperate with the goal of increasing the effectiveness of the UN.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed on the necessity of continuing the search for new spheres of joint action directed at qualitative movement on bilateral and transnational issues in U.S.-Soviet relations.

A detailed discussion took place, including with the participation of experts, on a range of economic questions. It was agreed that these useful discussions will be continued.

* * *

Both sides confirmed the utility of conducting regular meetings at the ministerial level for considering and resolving major problems of U.S.-Soviet cooperation.

NUCLEAR TESTING

In nuclear testing, the sides agreed to a package approach that would include three verification methods: on-site hydrodynamic measurements, on-site inspections, and in country seismic stations. They agreed to the right to use hydrodynamic and seismic methods for all nuclear tests whose [REDACTED] In addition, they agreed to the right for on-sight inspection for all tests whose [REDACTED]

ARM 433(2)(S)

OSD 3.3(b)(2)(5)

The sides also agreed that the drilling of satellite holes for the purpose of conducting hydrodynamic yield measurements will be carried out by the testing party.

It was further agreed that, in order to obtain a statistically significant number of data points to improve the national technical means of each side, each side will guarantee the other side the right to make on-site hydrodynamic yield measurement of at least two tests per year during the first five years following ratification of this treaty.

After five years, each side shall guarantee one such hydrodynamic measurement a year thereafter unless otherwise agreed by the two sides.

September 23, 1989

JOINT STATEMENT ON LEBANON

While expressing their deep concern over the absence of peace and a settlement in Lebanon, the United States and the Soviet Union reaffirm their urgent appeal to take all necessary measures to bring to an end the sufferings of the Lebanese people, and urge a continued search for a political solution of the Lebanese crisis. They reaffirm the assumption that there is no military solution to the problems of that country. A constructive dialogue between Lebanese who themselves must reach lasting agreements on peaceful arrangements in Lebanon on the basis of a balance of interests is the only rational path towards national reconciliation.

The United States and the Soviet Union welcome the resumption of the peacemaking mission of the Tripartite Committee of the Arab League on Lebanon in accordance with the mandate entrusted to it by the Casablanca Arab summit and the Committee's efforts aimed at a cease-fire, the lifting of blockades, and initiation of the process of political settlement. They call upon all the parties involved in Lebanese affairs to respond positively to these efforts and to do their utmost to support the Tripartite Committee's action to complete its work successfully. They also note the importance of extending strong international support for the activities of the Tripartite Committee and for their own part intend to proceed further in this direction. Both sides reaffirm their resolute position in favor of preserving the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the Lebanese state.

The United States and the Soviet Union condemn any acts of taking hostages and demand that they be set free no matter where or by whom they are held captive.

September 23, 1989

**JOINT STATEMENT
ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS**

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Date:

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During their September 22-23 meeting in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze reaffirmed the commitment of the United States and the USSR to pursue aggressively the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of all stockpiles of such weapons on the basis of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global ban. Both sides consider the early conclusion and entry into force of a convention to this effect to be one of the highest priorities for the international community. They believe that with the active and constructive participation of all states it will be possible to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date, and call upon all parties to the negotiations to join them in achieving this objective.

The two sides also believe that greater openness between them and among others could contribute to the prospects for reaching an early agreement on an effective ban on chemical weapons. As a concrete expression of the commitment of their two countries toward this end, the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange. The steps agreed upon in the Memorandum are intended to facilitate the process of negotiation, signature and ratification of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

The verification experiment and data exchange will be conducted in two phases. Phase I involves the exchange of general data on the sides' chemical weapons capabilities and a series of visits to relevant military and civil facilities on their respective territories. In Phase II the sides will exchange detailed data and permit on-site inspections to verify the accuracy of the information exchanged.

The sides also agreed to undertake a cooperative effort with respect to the destruction of chemical weapons. They agreed to reciprocal visits to monitor destruction operations of the other side, and to the exchange of information on past, current and planned destruction activities and procedures.

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The sides noted their agreement on some procedures for conducting challenge inspections and on the provisions governing the order of destruction of chemical weapons and of chemical weapons production facilities. These two approaches will be introduced into the multilateral negotiations in Geneva in an effort to contribute to those negotiations. They also stressed the need to concentrate in the near future on resolving remaining verification-related issues. The two sides intend to pursue intensively their bilateral discussions on a chemical weapons ban with the view to help achieve further progress in the multilateral negotiations.

The Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister expressed their grave concern about the growing danger posed to international peace and security by the risk of the illegal use of chemical weapons as long as such weapons exist and are spread. They reaffirmed the importance of and their commitment to the final declaration of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons held earlier this year as well as their commitment to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The two sides emphasized the obligation of all states not to use chemical weapons in violation of international law and urged that prompt and effective measures be taken by the international community if that obligation is violated. In this regard, they underscored their support for the UN Secretary-General in investigating reports of violations of the Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law.

The sides welcomed Australia's convening of a Government-Industry Conference Against Chemical Weapons, which has just concluded in Canberra. They noted that this conference provided an important opportunity for serious discussion between government and industry representatives from around the world.

Finally, the sides expressed the view that a truly global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons is the best means to address the threat posed by the spread of chemical weapons on a durable long term basis. In the meantime, the sides emphasized their readiness to attempt to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons. They intend to continue consultations on this issue.

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SECRET

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) ARMS CONTROL

(U) Background Bilateral/multilateral efforts toward CW ban date from 1970s. Soviet participation unhelpful. U.S. treaty text tabled at Conference on Disarmament in 1984. Soviet shift toward serious pursuit of treaty in 1987: admit possession of CW; accept anywhere-anytime no right of refusal challenge inspection proposal.

(S) (FYI: Challenge inspection under review within USG). OSD 3.3(b)(1))

(S) - Threat Soviet announced stockpile [REDACTED] U.S. estimates have run [REDACTED] At present, the intelligence community is reviewing; any new estimates will be much lower.

(U) - President Bush's UNGA Initiative (Tab 2)

(U) - Reaffirms commitment to total ban.

(U) - Proposes bilateral arrangement for a U.S.-Soviet mutually observed, cooperative destruction program. Each side would destroy down to a stockpile size about [REDACTED] of the U.S. stockpile.

(S) (FYI: The U.S. stockpile size [REDACTED] remains classified. NSD 24 (Tab 3) indicates that under the bilateral proposal the President envisions [REDACTED] OSD 3.3(b)(2),(5)

(U) - Declares that after a treaty is signed, provided the Soviets sign, the U.S. would destroy about [REDACTED] of its stockpile (calculated from the now current stockpile) during the first eight years. It would destroy the remaining [REDACTED] over the following two years, providing all CW-capable states had signed the treaty. If some had not, the destruction process would hold and the U.S. would retain a residual stockpile of [REDACTED] of our current stockpile.

(U) Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's UNGA Address Responds that the Soviets are ready to cease all CW production (which they claim already to have done) and renounce CW use under any circumstances. (FYI: The USSR and U.S. both reserve the right under the 1925 Geneva Protocol to use CW in retaliation for CW use.)

(U) U.S.-Soviet September MOU Provides for data exchange on sides' CW capabilities and visits and inspections to verify that data (Tab 4).

(U) Binary Production Production is to continue (Tab 5). During the period until all CW-capable states are treaty parties, the U.S.' (2%) residual CW capability should be as safe as possible. The modernization program may be restructured to emphasize longer range delivery systems.

(U) CW Destruction U.S. law requires that the U.S. unitary stockpile be destroyed by 30 April 1997, with possibility of 10% hold back for security reasons. Destruction schedule is at Tab 6.

(S) Definition of "CW-capable" States Has not been developed within USG. (State Dept "first cut" withdrawn due to internal disagreement.) OSD staff discussion of some possible approaches is at Tab 7.

OSD 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) ARMY 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)

Prepared by [REDACTED]

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS: BINARY PROGRAM

The chemical weapon modernization program calls for three binary systems: the 155mm artillery shell, the Bigeye bomb, and a chemical warhead for the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, in the absence of an effectively verifiable, comprehensive CW arms control agreement to which all CW-capable states are party, the US needs a minimal retaliatory stock for deterrence of CW use against the US or its allies. Development and production status:

155mm Binary Artillery Shell: FY 90: \$47M, FY 91: \$71.4M (all in procurement)

-- The M687 155mm artillery shell produces lethal, non-persistent nerve agent GB-2 upon firing.

-- Production began in 1987 with some problems at one of three production facilities. The Army identified the problem areas and fixed them. Overall, the status of production is satisfactory. We are confident the Congress will fully fund the program for FY 1990.

Bigeye Bomb: FY 90: \$6.9M, FY 91: \$69.9M (all in procurement)

-- The Bigeye binary chemical bomb will produce and disseminate in flight the lethal persistent nerve agent VX.

-- Bigeye has not yet entered production. It suffered a variety of political setbacks. Virtually all technical problems have been resolved.

-- Production could begin in FY 1991. But, Bigeye must first complete its next round of operational testing, scheduled for Feb - Aug 1990.

-- The FY 1989 Defense Authorization Act requires the GAO and the DoD Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation to certify that the Bigeye meets six pre-established testing criteria during its next round of tests before making a production decision.

MLRS Binary Chemical Warhead: FY 90: \$31.4M, FY 91: \$6.4M (all in RDT&E)

-- The Multiple Launch Rocket System Binary Chemical Warhead will provide the corps commander with a semi-persistent chemical weapon to attack mid-range targets.

-- It recently entered engineering development with production scheduled within a few years.

OSD 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)

Prepared by: Major [REDACTED]

ARMY 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)

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"CW-Capable States"

OSD 3.3(b)(2)(5)
~~ARMY 3.3(b)(2)(5)~~

The U.S. is committed to destroying the remaining [redacted] of its CW stockpile once all "CW-Capable states" have signed a multilateral treaty. There are two methods for identifying "CW-capable states": a general, criteria-based definition or a specific list of states.

One definition is: "the ability to build/ acquire CW and to deliver some amount of it during an attack. Countries with the ability to build/acquire CW who have not done so are not included." The strengths of this approach lie in its focus on those nations which pose a military/security threat and its flexibility to modify its "list" in response to new intelligence. Potential weaknesses include its inability to account for rapid break-out from an industrial base and its reliance on sensitive intelligence which could make it difficult to share with the international community.

One proposal for a specific list includes CD members and participants as well as NATO and WARSAW Pact nations. The attraction of this approach is its simplicity and straightforwardness. Intelligence would not be compromised and the "go to zero" prerequisite would be clear for the international community. Its weakness is that it is not security related. Therefore, it is both over and under inclusive; including nations which pose little risk while leaving out key countries of concern [redacted]. In addition, a list (without criteria) does not lend itself to amendment should global circumstances change after it is established.

OSD 3.3(b)(6)

A second proposal for a specific list adds to this proposal a "strategically important" category of countries. This would allow for the inclusion of the aforementioned nations. However, it is the most "finger-pointing" of all the proposals in spite of its pretense of furthering "universality." Once again, a discrete list does not readily allow for response to a changing world wherein a previously benign country [redacted] rapidly becomes CW-capable, as defined in the general definition.

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